Holding the COP31 Presidency is a huge opportunity for Australia, which it should use to tackle climate as a fundamental threat to security - much as the Pacific does.
After years of wrangling, clarity on how COP31 will be hosted in 2026 has finally emerged.
The big question now is what Australian should focus on driving in the negotiations as President of COP*, while Türkiye itself hosts the event. Australia should use the good will gained in averting vain brinkmanship to retain COP31 in Adelaide, by advancing an agenda which meets the Pacific interests it sought to elevate in the first place:
Countering the risks that climate impacts pose for peace, security, and prosperity.
An effective and concrete focus for Australia’s role in leading the COP31 climate negotiations would be to go all in on advancing Pacific leadership on solutions. The PM has already flagged this, as has Türkiye noted their support, particularly in financing adaptation to prepare for and blunt the worst impacts of climate change.
This could be a cornerstone of any outcomes Australia is able to achieve for pre-COP and any meetings with Pacific Leaders over the next year. It is also the right theme to bring more coherence to Australia’s converging foreign, development, security, and finance policy approaches.
There are already glimpses of how effective this can be, including through the bilateral security deals Australia has been striking around the Pacific, but it must advance and extend Pacific approaches to collaboration with global partners.
This strategy must be comprehensive, and include shoring up regional security and prosperity through many seemingly disparate areas, including global supply chain and finance sector disruption, food security and displaced communities, and preventing stressors that can amplify conflict and geopolitical instability.
Emphasizing the security dimensions of climate change which are explicitly outlined in the Pacific Leaders Boe Declaration (shortly up for a renewed action plan) certainly contrasts with Türkiye’s position, who officially reject a link between climate and security. As President of COP, Australia can work to push outcomes regardless of Türkiye’s position on this, securing a win for the Pacific in the process.
Advancing progress in on this issue would be a worthy and forward-thinking goal and legacy that aligns with Australia’s own recognition of these threats, and further leverages its influence and roles with a seat on the Peacebuilding commission from 2025-2027, just as it runs for a seat on the UN Security Council for 2029-30.
An easy criticism of this agenda is that the United States has withdrawn from climate change as a priority under Trump, and therefore any focus on climate must focus even more squarely on domestic economic interests and needs. That ignores the substantial interest outside of the current US administration in continuing to treat climate change seriously. Prioritizing responses to climate change as a risk to peace and security an excellent moment to provide leadership and further engage with other key partners who share that concern, like those in the Pacific, but also in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
For Australia to play this role, however, it must further communicate the extent and scope of international climate risk as it sees it – both to emphasize the urgency of those issues with international partners and many competing geopolitical priorities, and also at home with Australian taxpayers who will bear the costs of a climate not kept in check.
While the National Climate Risk Assessment (NCRA) released earlier this year demonstrated the immense costs and complications Australians will face from even a moderately warmer climate than today, it did not tell the full picture.
In fact, it explicitly held back from exploring international and regional dimensions of climate risk, beyond the bread crumbs it had to demonstrate given Australia’s wide exposure to cross-border risks as an island continent.
This is an opportunity to finally declassify and publish a synthesis of the Office of National Intelligence (ONI)’s 2022 national intelligence estimate on the regional risks posed by climate change. Whatever the reticence of government to delay its release to now, it has the opportunity to further steer the domestic conversation away from the distraction of whether reducing emissions is necessary (it truly, truly is), towards what every country faces in a disrupted climate.
Without ONI’s report findings being declassified, many parts of Government itself cannot engage with its underlying analysis, which limits the extent to which policy can be designed to appropriately grapple with the risks ONI is aware of.
Advancing all of this, towards COP31 as an agenda on climate and security in the negotiations, towards greater Pacific resilience and security, and Australia’s own domestic security, requires a comprehensive approach that looks far beyond 2026.
In this, Australia has an opportunity to not just be a taker on global trends, but to help push back on a disrupted future it can and should take action to avoid.
*(Although Türkiye will be the official COP President, Australia's statements have indicated Australia will hold some aspect of the Presidency to lead negotiations throughout the year and during COP31 itself - though this may not include the Agenda for Action, which would limit the scope of what Australian can achieve outside of the official negotiation tracks).
Michael Copage
Director of CoTerran.